Katarzyna PeLczyNska-NaLEcz, Krzystof Strachota and Maciej Falkowski
The disintegration of the Soviet Union triggered one of the largest experiments in state formation in modern times. 15 new states emerged with hardly any experiences in statehood and difficult geo strategic positions as well as social and cultural identity, subsequently bringing about a new range of para-state entities.
Four Forms of Para-State Entities in the Post Soviet Region
As-if States: Internationally recognized but lacking essential control over its territory.
Almost States: Aspirant state entities that enjoy control over territory but lack international recognition.
Black-Spots: Areas under local governance/control (clans, criminal organizations etc.) that are neither recognized as nor aspire for statehood.
States Within States: Regions that formally recognize central governments but maintain a high degree of independence that is tolerated by the former for various reasons. These don’t seek international recognition and enjoy clearly defined institutions of power.
These para-state classifications are not necessarily mutually exclusive. In the 1990s in Chechnya Black spots existed in an almost state entity. Again in the case of Moldova and Azerbaijan, despite the existence of para state entities, the central governments continued to function relatively well and cannot thus be termed as As-if States.
These definitions are also not exhaustive. There may exist hybrid forms, consisting selective features of these classifications. For example in Georgia’s Java-khetia or southern Kyrgyzstan certain spheres of activity are controlled by clan or criminal structures operating in parallel to state authorities.
As-if States:
Reduced effectiveness of the state has plagued all the post soviet countries except for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. However deep incapacity that qualifies for as-if states is evident in regions with extended civil wars e.g. Georgia (1991-93) and Tajikistan (1992-97). Both these states faced problems in forming and legitimizing their central authorities and exercise monopoly over violence.
The Russian federation with its massive size and patch work of nationalities is a complex case. In its initial years with the legislative crisis the state authorities were completely paralyzed lacking any credible control. This eventually fomented the Fiscal crisis of 1992 where
some entities, in a state of fiscal deficit, even issued surrogate money independent of the state. The process of state degradation reached its peak in the mid 90s.The condition of states in the region began to stabilize in this decade, where a gradual shift towards state legitimacy was observed and state control over territory considerably increased (Russia, Georgia and Tajikistan being prime examples). In Russia reforms were implemented by President Vladimir Putin, but were not necessarily democratic in nature. The 2003 ‘Rose revolution’ resulting in the resignation of president Shevardnadze and democratic election of his successor Saakashvili in Georgia was the turning point. The pro NATO/EU reforms affected were supported by the west and the effectiveness of the state was thus not brought about by any credible democratic process.
Tajikistan however was not able to recover from its catastrophic civil war on its own. The Afghanistan war forced the external supporters, including Russia, Iran and Afghanistan, of the infighting Tajik Clans to reconcile. An unprecedented compromise ensued that admitted the opposition into the political structures of power moving the conflict to a political level. Control over Karategin Valley (black spot), refuge to the Islamic movement of Uzbekistan however remained elusive. Ultimately the war on terror freed Tajikistan from threats engendered by the Afghan conflict, and its accession to the anti terror coalition strengthened the Tajik government and entailed external assistance.
Almost-States:
This category includes South Ossetia and Abkhazia, the two separatist republics in Georgia, as well as Nagorno Karabakh, nominally part of Azerbaijan, and Transnistria in Moldova. The first three had enjoyed some autonomy during the soviet ere. To a greater extent in Nagorno-Karabakh, Abkhazia and Chechnya and to a lesser extent in Transnistria, separatist tendencies came about through ethnic conflict that turned violent. Russia was a key factor that prevented disintegration of the nominal state in Transnistria, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Armenia with Russia’s support was involved in Nagorno Karabakh and at present maintains it as a defacto part of its own territory. All these states in the presence of external influence exist as de-facto satellites. In all these cases, though to some degree democratic institutions exist, however they are not functionally democratic, where political freedoms are restricted by deep rooted influences. Abkhazia perhaps has developed the most pluralist system but even there Bagpash, elected in 2004 against Moscow’s will had to accept, under pressure, his political rival as vice president.
States Within States:
This form of ‘deficit of the state’ was most common in the Russian federation of the 1990s, and even before the dissolution where such entities were common along ethnic lines. Tatarstan and Bashkortostan were the republics that achieved the highest degree of separation, adopting constitutions and legislation often in contradiction with the central government. Putin’s first phase of reform, introducing uniform legislature pretty much did away with such entities.
Another example is Georgia’s Ajarian Republic (1991-2004), where for 13 yrs powere remained in the hands of Aslan Abashidze, a member of the local communist nomanklatura and chairman of the supreme council of Ajaria. Following the collapse of USSR he took over absolute control with the help of his own police force. Following the ‘Rose revolution’ however, owing to the support of the people of Ajaria it was integrated back into Georgia.
Nakhichevan in Azerbaijan and Chechnya in Russia are two exceptions of states within states that did not disappear in the post soviet reformation. Nakhichevan is an autonomous enclave of Azerbaijan, with the status of a republic. The conflict in Nagorno Karabakh has isolated this entity from direct roots to the central government. The political ties with Azerbaijan however remain strong, where the dominant political clan originates from this region. The ‘vicegerent’ who has ruled there since 1993 maintains an authoritarian hold over the region and is loyal to the government in Azerbaijan. The entity enjoys in turn support from both Azerbaijan and Turkey, where it shares a direct border with the latter.
Black Spots:
These are d
ifficult to describe because of a lack of borders and defined institutions. In the post soviet era many such ‘black spots’ emerged in connection with long term armed conflict (Georgia, Tajikistan and Chechnya) however most disappeared soon after the end of conflict and introduction of reforms.In Georgia the Kodori Valley bordering Abkhazia and the Pankisi Gorge bordering Chechnya are two examples. Apart from armed conflict difficult geographic access too isolated these regions contributing to their status as ‘black spots’. Pankisi Gorge populated by Kist-Chechens was a natural refuge for Chechen rebels, was a major point of contention with Russia. Over time it came to be associated with Arab Mujahideen supporting the Chechens. Eventually with the pressures stemming from the War on Terror, this black spot disappeared between late 2001 and early 2002.
Kodori Valley, situated between the separatist regions of Abkhazia and Mingrelia, remained rebellious throughout the 1990s. it became a shelter for paramilitary and criminal organizations like the White Legion and the Forest Brothers, and even Chechen Rebels. Following the ‘Rose Revolution’ the upper part of the valley was finally incorporated into Georgia. This black spot however was transformed into a scene of conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia.
Javakhetia, an Armenian populated region in Southern Georgia is yet another example of a geographically isolated potential black spot. Distrust between the Armenians and the local government fueled separatist tendencies. Armenia, that did not wish to get involved with the already ongoing Nogorno Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, tried to mitigate the situation. Russian presence in the region was also potent as it was viewed as a protector of the Armenians. At one time in the region, Armenian and Russian currency actually dominated the Georgian lari. The situation in Javakhetia was not far from conditions in a ‘black spot’, however following the ‘Rose Revolution’ the dynamic changed and the region is now gradually being integrated into mainstream Georgia.
In Tajikistan, the most marginalized region in the soviet era, Karategin Valley became a strong hold of Islamic opposition, was home to the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), base of operations that attempted instigating an Islamic revolution in Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. Also Tajik Mujahedeen with strong links with Afghanistan (including criminal networks) were based in this region. The region was gradually pacified on one hand with Russia’s complicated game in the region that played the instability card to put pressure and seek agreements with regional neighbors. Also the shifting interests of powers such as China, Russia and the United States in an evolved global security environment played a role in pacifying the region that at present seems to be a stable part of Tajikistan.
The ‘Wahhabi Republic’ in Dagestan (1998-99) is another example of a black spot, that was established by Islamists from several villages, independent of outside influences, that effectively dismantled Russian state structures, introduced Sharia law, and brought some order to a previously chaotic region. Later however the republic developed links with Chechen rebels. The Republic ceased to exist following the attack of federal troops in September 1999, at the same time when the Chechen intervention triggered the second Chechen war.
Tajikistan’s Gornobadakhshan Autonomous Region of the 1990s is another special, paradoxical example of a black spot. Poverty and inefficiency exacerbated by isolation were festering in the region. Imminent crisis was averted by the intervention of the fourth Agha Khan, spiritual leader of the Ismaili communities of the region. The Agha Khan Foundation became a central entity in the governance and development of the region independent of Tajikistan. Alternative institutions replaced the state and even established cross border relations with non-state entities, characteristic of a ‘black spot’. When the Tajik state gained strength it reestablished ties with the region, integrating it back into the mainstream.
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Business and Politics in the Muslim World (BPM)refers to the project entitled, "Globalized Business and Politics: A View from the Muslim World.' The blog development project has been undertaken and jointly developed by the Gilani Research Foundation and BPM as a free resource and social discussion tool.
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Business and Politics in the Muslim World (BPM)refers to the project entitled, "Globalized Business and Politics: A View from the Muslim World.' The blog development project has been undertaken and jointly developed by the Gilani Research Foundation and BPM as a free resource and social discussion tool.
Please Preview your comments before posting.
