Foreign Affairs January 2009
Summary- A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age
By Robert M. Gates- U.S. Secretary of Defense.
Summary- A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age
By Robert M. Gates- U.S. Secretary of Defense.
US Defence Secretary Robert Gates, in his article that appeared in the
Foreign Affairs in January 2009, notes that the primary focus of Pentagon's National Defense Strategy is balance, where by the Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs. Such a strategy is inevitable considering today’s conventional and sub conventional security arena—as well as tomorrows projected conflicts.
Unconventional thinking
The secretary opines that the United States' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts. At present there is going to be an inevitable projected decline in forces in Iraq. However the US will continue to maintain its advisory position and counterterrorism efforts for years to come. Meanwhile Afghanistan, a more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time.
In the current scenario the US must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that it ends up neglecting its current commitments. Traditionally support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the Defense Department's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and also in Congress. The major concern, Gates voices, is the lack of commensurate institutional support -- including in the Pentagon -- for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.
Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term efforts against ‘terrorists’ but the United States cannot ‘kill or capture its way to victory’. These so called ‘Kinetic operations’ must be subordinate to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented. In the future likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states. Hence greater focus is likely to be meted out to indirect intervention.
However even the biggest of wars will require "small wars" capabilities, but one should bear in mind that nearly every major deployment of U.S. forces has led to a longer subsequent military presence to maintain stability. In the Secretary’s opinion, so far, mainly in matters of capacity to maintain security and stability in the aftermath of active conflict, the military and civilian elements of the United States' national security apparatus have grown increasingly out of balance. To truly achieve victory, as Clausewitz defined it -- to attain a political objective -- the United States needs a military ‘whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.’
Conventional threats in perspective
The 2008 National Defense Strategy concludes that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. To keep some perspective the U.S. Naval battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined -- and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners.
Even as its military hones and institutionalizes new and unconventional skills, the United States still has to contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries. Both Russia and China have increased their defense spending and modernization programs to include air defense and fighter capabilities that in some cases approach the United States' own. In addition, there is the potentially toxic mix of ‘rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons’. All these potential adversaries have learned that it is unwise to confront the United States directly on conventional military terms.
Yet even though the days of hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, Beijing's investments in cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, antiaircraft and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles perturb the US. Russia's conventional offensive in Georgia too was augmented with a sophisticated cyber attack and what Gates terms as a ‘well-coordinated propaganda campaign’. Political scientist Colin Gray has noted that the categories of warfare are blurring. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction -- from the sophisticated to the simple -- being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.
The United States seeks a better balance in the portfolio of its capabilities in accordance with this blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflicts. The Department of Defense's conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The challenge is whether these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military's mindset and bureaucracy.
Sustaining the institution
At present one of the enduring issues the military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward the command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops. Another is whether formations and units organized, trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and fast enough to dissuade or co-opt them -- or, more significantly, to build the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying.
For decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict. The base budget for fiscal year 2009, for example, contained more than $180 billion for procurement, research, and development, the overwhelming
preponderance of which was for conventional systems. What the US needs to be conscious of is that the capabilities needed for the complex conflicts the United States is actually in and most likely to face in the foreseeable future also have strong and sustained institutional support over the long term.
As a large, hierarchical organization, some tendencies of organizational behavior, as identified by Robert Komer, to some degree impede the U.S. national security apparatus’ adaptation of evolved realities. The advances in precision, sensor, information, and satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. But one should not neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. In conclusion The Pentagon has to do more than modernize its conventional forces; it must also focus on today's unconventional conflicts -- and tomorrow's. §
Foreign Affairs in January 2009, notes that the primary focus of Pentagon's National Defense Strategy is balance, where by the Department of Defense must set priorities and consider inescapable tradeoffs and opportunity costs. Such a strategy is inevitable considering today’s conventional and sub conventional security arena—as well as tomorrows projected conflicts.Unconventional thinking
The secretary opines that the United States' ability to deal with future threats will depend on its performance in current conflicts. At present there is going to be an inevitable projected decline in forces in Iraq. However the US will continue to maintain its advisory position and counterterrorism efforts for years to come. Meanwhile Afghanistan, a more complex and difficult long-term challenge than Iraq, will require a significant U.S. military and economic commitment for some time.
In the current scenario the US must not be so preoccupied with preparing for future conventional and strategic conflicts that it ends up neglecting its current commitments. Traditionally support for conventional modernization programs is deeply embedded in the Defense Department's budget, in its bureaucracy, in the defense industry, and also in Congress. The major concern, Gates voices, is the lack of commensurate institutional support -- including in the Pentagon -- for the capabilities needed to win today's wars and some of their likely successors.
Direct military force will continue to play a role in the long-term efforts against ‘terrorists’ but the United States cannot ‘kill or capture its way to victory’. These so called ‘Kinetic operations’ must be subordinate to measures aimed at promoting better governance, economic programs, and efforts to address the grievances among the discontented. In the future likely catastrophic threats to the U.S. homeland are more likely to emanate from failing states than from aggressor states. Hence greater focus is likely to be meted out to indirect intervention.
However even the biggest of wars will require "small wars" capabilities, but one should bear in mind that nearly every major deployment of U.S. forces has led to a longer subsequent military presence to maintain stability. In the Secretary’s opinion, so far, mainly in matters of capacity to maintain security and stability in the aftermath of active conflict, the military and civilian elements of the United States' national security apparatus have grown increasingly out of balance. To truly achieve victory, as Clausewitz defined it -- to attain a political objective -- the United States needs a military ‘whose ability to kick down the door is matched by its ability to clean up the mess and even rebuild the house afterward.’
Conventional threats in perspective
The 2008 National Defense Strategy concludes that although U.S. predominance in conventional warfare is not unchallenged, it is sustainable for the medium term given current trends. To keep some perspective the U.S. Naval battle fleet is still larger than the next 13 navies combined -- and 11 of those 13 navies are U.S. allies or partners.
Even as its military hones and institutionalizes new and unconventional skills, the United States still has to contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries. Both Russia and China have increased their defense spending and modernization programs to include air defense and fighter capabilities that in some cases approach the United States' own. In addition, there is the potentially toxic mix of ‘rogue nations, terrorist groups, and nuclear, chemical, or
biological weapons’. All these potential adversaries have learned that it is unwise to confront the United States directly on conventional military terms.Yet even though the days of hair-trigger superpower confrontation are over, Beijing's investments in cyber warfare, anti-satellite warfare, antiaircraft and anti-ship weaponry, submarines, and ballistic missiles perturb the US. Russia's conventional offensive in Georgia too was augmented with a sophisticated cyber attack and what Gates terms as a ‘well-coordinated propaganda campaign’. Political scientist Colin Gray has noted that the categories of warfare are blurring. One can expect to see more tools and tactics of destruction -- from the sophisticated to the simple -- being employed simultaneously in hybrid and more complex forms of warfare.
The United States seeks a better balance in the portfolio of its capabilities in accordance with this blended high-low mix of adversaries and types of conflicts. The Department of Defense's conventional modernization programs seek a 99 percent solution over a period of years. Stability and counterinsurgency missions require 75 percent solutions over a period of months. The challenge is whether these two different paradigms can be made to coexist in the U.S. military's mindset and bureaucracy.
Sustaining the institution
At present one of the enduring issues the military struggles with is whether personnel and promotions systems designed to reward the command of American troops will be able to reflect the importance of advising, training, and equipping foreign troops. Another is whether formations and units organized, trained, and equipped to destroy enemies can be adapted well enough and fast enough to dissuade or co-opt them -- or, more significantly, to build the capacity of local security forces to do the dissuading and destroying.
For decades there has been no strong, deeply rooted constituency inside the Pentagon or elsewhere for institutionalizing the capabilities necessary to wage asymmetric or irregular conflict. The base budget for fiscal year 2009, for example, contained more than $180 billion for procurement, research, and development, the overwhelming
preponderance of which was for conventional systems. What the US needs to be conscious of is that the capabilities needed for the complex conflicts the United States is actually in and most likely to face in the foreseeable future also have strong and sustained institutional support over the long term.As a large, hierarchical organization, some tendencies of organizational behavior, as identified by Robert Komer, to some degree impede the U.S. national security apparatus’ adaptation of evolved realities. The advances in precision, sensor, information, and satellite technologies have led to extraordinary gains in what the U.S. military can do. But one should not neglect the psychological, cultural, political, and human dimensions of warfare. In conclusion The Pentagon has to do more than modernize its conventional forces; it must also focus on today's unconventional conflicts -- and tomorrow's. §
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Business and Politics in the Muslim World (BPM)refers to the project entitled, "Globalized Business and Politics: A View from the Muslim World.' The blog development project has been undertaken and jointly developed by the Gilani Research Foundation and BPM as a free resource and social discussion tool.
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Business and Politics in the Muslim World (BPM)refers to the project entitled, "Globalized Business and Politics: A View from the Muslim World.' The blog development project has been undertaken and jointly developed by the Gilani Research Foundation and BPM as a free resource and social discussion tool.
Please Preview your comments before posting.
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